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Abstract 
 
 
Deliberative mechanisms surrounding climate change politics in advanced democracies have, for some 
time, been at the mercy of ideological and political economic commitments. One need only to look at the 
banning of protests and marches during the 2015 COP21 international climate talks in Paris, or the 
historical risk assessments of violent international conflict linked to climate concerns by Germany and 
the US to see that the political institutionalization of climate change is pervasive. On the other hand, the 
discursive demarcation by climate science has consistently taken up two arguments in opposition to 
climate politics: (a) the view that political discourses on climate variability should rest on climatological 
models and the research of climate experts, and (b) that the climatological data itself serves as the 
impartial intermediary through which we can provide an empirical refutation to ideological rhetoric and 
economic influences on climate change politics. I contend that in the attempt to bridge the political and 
scientific camps we transpose a central feature in democratic climate deliberation—namely, the ontology 
of the citizen; who in the discursive bridge is relegated to a medium of exchange for both camps, rather 
than a commensurate party in the climatological discussion. 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Deliberative mechanisms surrounding climate change politics in advanced democracies 
have, for some time, been at the mercy of ideological and political economic 
commitments. One need only to look at the banning of protests and marches during the 
2015 COP21 international climate talks in Paris,1  or the historical risk assessments of 
violent international conflict linked to climate concerns by Germany and the US2  to see 
that the political institutionalization of climate change is pervasive. On the other hand, 
the discursive demarcation by climate science has consistently taken up two arguments 
in opposition to climate politics: (a) the view that political discourses on climate 
                                                          
1 Quinn, Ben. “COP21 Climate Marches in Paris Not Authorised following Attacks.” The 
Guardian. N.p., 18 Nov. 2015. 
2 Lucke, Franziskus Von, Zehra Wellmann, and Thomas Diez. “What’s at Stake in Securitising 
Climate Change? Towards a Differentiated Approach.” Geopolitics 19.4 (2014): 857-84. 
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variability should rest on climatological models and the research of climate experts, and 
(b) that the climatological data itself serves as the impartial intermediary through which 
we can provide an empirical refutation to ideological rhetoric and economic influences 
on climate change politics. I contend that in the attempt to bridge the political and 
scientific camps we transpose a central feature in democratic climate deliberation—
namely, the ontology of the citizen; who in the discursive bridge is relegated to a 
medium of exchange for both camps, rather than a commensurate party in the 
climatological discussion. 
 
To give the ontological space of the citizen context it should first be observed that, in 
most scholarship cases, the agreed upon deliberative split in advanced democracies has 
circumscribed climate change into three operant categories: (1) the political, (2) the 
scientific, and (3) the public qua citizens. With respect to (1) and (2) —the primary 
parties of most climatological discourse—we have a division between political actors 
with specific ideological and economic interests, and climatologists who represent a 
knowledge set dominated by experts in the field. Yet, the parties that comprise (3) are 
perhaps the most difficult to discuss relative to terminological distinctions, as they 
receive different classificatory schemes by different authors. A more discreet approach 
to (3) is to assume “the public” is comprised of “ordinary citizens”, “lay persons”3 and 
a diverse population otherwise outside the realm of discursively applicable expert 
knowledge.4  Others look at the public or citizenry as a polyvocal and multilocal body 
of potential; one which can learn, grow, be empowered, etc. and can thus increase their 
degree of democratic-deliberative competency.5  In both approaches to (3) it is apparent 
that the most critical players in democratic deliberation are the majority of democratic 
subjects who, by the nature of the aforementioned categorical structure, do not fall into 
categories (1) or (2).  
 
The rationale of highlighting this three-fold split is to draw attention to a problem we 
find in the scholarship of climate discourse: namely, that two elite parties in advanced 
democracies are often understood by researchers as having a vested interest and a 
defined jurisdiction in which they can enter into a deliberative schema or at least 
autonomously generate climate discourse. Meanwhile the third party—that of the 
citizen—is often times incongruent with, or defined in such a way that, excludes them 
from being immediately considered as equal deliberative members in discourse 
generation. The emphasis on the citizen—the comprising member of the public—is a 
consistent blind spot in the scholarship of deliberation based climate discourse, as most 
                                                          
3 Whyte, Kyle Powys, and Robert P. Crease. “Trust, Expertise, and the Philosophy of 
Science.” Synthese 177.3 (2010), p. 415 
4 Moore, Alfred. “Democratic Reason, Democratic Faith, and the Problem of Expertise.” Critical 
Review 26.1-2 (2014): 101-14, p. 110-112 
5 Fischer, Frank. Democracy and Expertise: Reorienting Policy Inquiry. Oxford: Oxford UP, 
2009; p. 96-100 
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writers tend to focus on the development of a discursive bridge between the political 
economic elites of climate politics and the academic elites of climate science.  
 
Framework for the Political and Scientific Divide 
 
In order to draw attention to the ontological space of the deliberative citizen I will 
utilize one of the most comprehensive approaches to the climatological discursive 
divide, exemplified in the work of Hayley Stevenson and John Dryzek. In their recent 
paper “The Discursive Democratisation of Global Climate Governance” (2012), they 
explore the possible reconciliation of the dividing line between the demands of 
sustaining climate politics in a deliberative democracy and the demands put forth by 
climate change scientists. Stevenson and Dryzek argue that only by attempting to find a 
common ground for discourse, can climate politics and climate science become an 
accessible deliberative space for all citizens in a “global public sphere.”6  They 
conclude that there are several zones which political economic institutions and climate 
science can both interact in and ultimately share. These two seemingly disparate 
spheres of politics and science however are “polycentric” and subsequently necessitate 
a study of climate discourses common to both.7   
 
Stevenson and Dryzek offer a compelling analysis and a nuanced solution to the 
deliberative split. In using them as the framework for my argument, it is worth noting 
that I do not disagree with either their overall methodology or the logical ordering of 
their argument—on the contrary I believe Stevenson and Dryzek are quite strong in 
these two areas. Where I do see a problem, however, is in their attempt to find a 
“discursive bridge” between climate politics and science. To restate the nature of the 
problem: even in this type of characterization of climate deliberation, the ontological 
role of the citizen is relegated to a medium of exchange. What Stevenson and Dryzek 
have done (like many other scholars8) is to pose a discursive formation that must pass 
through the commitments of political and academic elites prior to their introduction in 
the deliberative realm of citizens. The result, as we shall see, does little to advance the 
discourse beyond how the elite parties have conceived of the ontological role of the 
citizen. The scholarship, exemplified by Stevenson and Dryzek, consistently maintains 
a space for the citizen where they can act as a mere recipient or transmitter of 
knowledge rather than an equal participant in knowledge formation. 
 
  
 
                                                          
6 Stevenson, Hayley, and John S. Dryzek. “The Discursive Democratisation of Global Climate 
Governance.” Environmental Politics 21.2 (2012). p. 193-194 
7 Ibid. p. 204 
8 Pearse, Rebecca. “Climate Capitalism and Its Discontents.” Global Environmental Politics 14.1 
(2014): 130-35. 
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Stevenson and Dryzek: A Restatement 
 
Stevenson and Dryzek begin their paper with an institutional divide. The two parties on 
either side of this divide are comprised of political economic institutions on the one 
hand, and climate science institutions on the other. It should be observed that these are 
not the terms Stevenson and Dryzek employ; rather they describe the former party in 
terms of political actors, administrative bodies, and economic influences via markets 
and corporations. The latter party is described in monolithic and otherwise homogenous 
terms (“climate science”, “scientist”, etc.). The implicit assumption by the authors is 
that there exists a shared field of study in climatology and the data across the discipline 
is—for the most part—commonly accepted both in terms of methodology and results. 
As was stated in the in the introduction: both of these categorizations are common in 
the scholarship; they both fall under the classification of what some have called 
“technical knowledge” or a type of knowledge in deliberative democracy, that through 
either consensus or policy, grants those who attain it a level of expertise.9 
 
The bifurcated view of climate sciences as a united force opposite the more actor-
centered politics is not an uncommon one. “One of the most striking features of recent 
debates about climate change is the disconnect between the organization of economic 
activity and the accumulating body of science pointing to potentially devastating 
consequences,” wrote Levy and Spicer.10  They go on to contend that the complex 
multiplicity of views in economic and political discourse should begin to find a 
common social ontology on par with the consistency of the “accumulating body of 
science” that is climatology. Roman Felli observes that discursive contradictions in 
proposed solutions via climate change data act as a foundation from which we can 
index the political economic strategies of entities like international trade unions. As 
such, argues Felli, political economic organizations tend to have “overlapping 
strategies” rather than collaborative data.11  In both cases the political economic 
institutions are seen as disjointed or merely market focused whereas climate science—
as peer-reviewed and consensus based—is more unified in its conclusions. On the basis 
of these two different approaches to climatology, there is a distinct need for a common 
discourse to be established. 
 
While Stevenson and Dryzek do not elaborate on the monolithic nature of climate 
science they do suppose that as far as political economic institutions treat climate 
change: “there is no ‘nodal’ discourse…”12  As such, they emphasize that the primary 
                                                          
9 Fischer, Frank p. 138-142 
10 Levy, D. L., and A. Spicer. “Contested Imaginaries and the Cultural Political Economy of 
Climate Change.” Organization 20.5 (2013): p. 659 
11 Felli, Romain. “An Alternative Socio-ecological Strategy? International Trade Unions’ 
Engagement with Climate Change.” Review of International Political Economy 21.2 (2013): p. 
378-381 
12 Stevenson, Hayley, and John S. Dryzek, p. 20 
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space for bridging these two institutions is in “democratic enclaves.”13  These 
enclaves—which represent limited spaces for competence to develop “prior to 
engagement with other discourses”—serve as the initial stage for disparate discourses 
to eventually interact with each other. By bringing the beginnings of discourse 
formation to prominence, the respective enclaves of each institution can begin to reflect 
and contest one another on equal footing. This contestation subsequently yields an 
interstice whereby the divide between climate science institutions and political 
economic institutions can begin to provide the mechanisms of deliberation through an 
inclusive and mutual acknowledgement of each other’s jurisdiction and field of 
knowledge. 
 
Stevenson and Dryzek argue that if climate politics and climate science are to construct 
a discursive bridge thereby rectifying their divide, they must do so by finding areas of 
intersection already present within their (A) “…ontology of discourse” (B) 
“Assumptions about natural relationships” (C) “Agents and their motives.” And (D) 
“Key metaphors and rhetorical devices.”14  Through analysis of these four areas, we can 
begin to look at discourse generation and where it is shared across the respective parties 
in climate deliberation. With this process of bridging, we can focus on linkages in the 
use of terms like “legitimacy, accountability, fairness, and representation…” and their 
use by democratic actors and observers. This focus on linked terms is important 
because “[t]hese terms… provide the basic vocabulary of democracy.”15   
 
To further appreciate the bridging solution, it is worth noting that Stevenson and 
Dryzek actually think of the citizen as ontologically prior to discourse generation. What 
they propose is that the citizen, as a discursive body, is already an equal partner in 
climate change deliberation—the problem is that the citizen is commonly, what Whyte 
and Crease call, an “unrecognized contributor.”16  In other words, the citizen has as 
much potential for discursive bridging as climate science or climate politics, but goes 
unrecognized by those two elite parties due to their non-expert status. Stevenson and 
Dryzek’s solution strikes right at the heart of the issue by looking for discursive 
patterns in the citizens qua democratic subjects that can be bridged with climate science 
and politics. By looking for preliminary discourses shared between the political, the 
scientific, and the public citizen we can bring each party together in a deliberative 
schema that still allows us to make decisions about climate change without doing away 
with the value of democratic mechanisms. 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 Ibid. p. 202 
14 Stevenson, Hayley, and John S. Dryzek, p. 193 
15 Ibid. p. 189 
16 Whyte, Kyle Powys, and Robert P. Crease, p. 415-418 
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Citizen as Medium of Exchange 
 
There are two central problems in Stevenson and Dryzek’s ontology of the citizen. The 
first is the transposition of the role of the citizen and second in the available space that 
the citizen occupies in climate change deliberation. Climate science and politics 
intersect in certain areas of discourse—these areas of intersection are valuable as they 
serve as the substructure from which bridges between the parties can be constructed. As 
was observed above, the role of citizen in this process is pre-supposed as an equal 
participant, but they are equal only in the sense that they participate in discourse—not 
in their capacity for discourse generation. To clarify: the role of citizen is understood to 
be that of the non-expert, whose knowledge is immediately accessible to anyone 
including political economic actors and scientists. Whereas the role of scientists can be 
understood by their capacity to “compel action” and the role of the political economic 
actor to enact and directly alter policy17 —the citizen can lay no direct claim to either of 
the roles due to a lack of expertise. 
 
The ontological space that Stevenson and Dryzek leave for the citizen is the ‘bridge’ 
itself. The scholarship on climate deliberation has constructed the polarized nature of 
climatology discourse such that there no immediate connection between science and 
politics absent a medium. By recognizing and exploring a discursive gap between their 
different approaches to climatology, politics and climate science have, in effect, 
articulated an ontological space for the citizen to occupy. The citizen serves as the 
medium of knowledge exchange between the climate scientists and the policy makers 
or the ideologues and those academics seen as pushing their research agenda. The 
discourse of the citizenry can be informed by scientific knowledge and can 
subsequently inform political economic actors in democracies. In other cases, the 
knowledge of the citizen can strengthen scientific claims with local knowledge which 
will then be presented to the political community.18   
 
The citizen, ontologically speaking, is conceived of as an informant and informer to 
climate science discourse—they are relegated to a medium of exchange for knowledge. 
Citizens can be informed by climate science experts if and when they view said 
scientific experts as credible and trustworthy, and this knowledge can then be carried 
forward into democratic participation.19  Political economic institutions can use citizens 
are informants, determining the content of their discourse to better assess policy 
changes and ideological commitments. The bridge between science and politics in 
climate deliberation sets up a political economics of climatology, in which the citizen 
can be understood as an indicator for both elite parties to communicate discursive 
                                                          
17 Briggle, A. “Review: Questioning Expertise.” Social Studies of Science 38.3 (2008): p. 466-
467 
18 Whyte, Kyle Powys, and Robert P. Crease, p. 417; 422-423 
19 Ibid. p.412-413 
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objectives to the other. The deliberative space left for citizens is constructed at the point 
of intersection between climate science and politics, and that space transposes the 
ontologically prior notion of the citizen body into democratic subjects who cannot see 
themselves as the nucleus of democratic deliberation at all. 
 
There is a clear difficulty in grasping how any sort of bridge between political 
economic institutions and climate science would allow citizens to recognize themselves 
as the central or even equal participants in discourse. One alternative argument put 
forth by Pepermans & Maeseele suggests that democratic subjects can always be 
understood as participants in some type of mediated discourse; or at least they 
participate in the public and private institutions that are constructing the discourse 
which they interact with.20  Anabela Carvalho took this argument further in 2010; 
suggesting that the very basis for how subjects see themselves as democratic citizens 
within a climate change debate is dependent on media influences (a subset of political 
economic institutions).21  For both of these authors however, the key feature of 
participation for the democratic subject is in their ability to recognize potential 
deliberation through mediation—which is antecedently no different than a medium for 
exchange. 
 
These mediated discourses, unlike the arguments of Stevenson and Dryzek, do not take 
the citizen as ontologically prior to the process. Rather, they concern themselves with 
constructing a discourse outside of citizens or beyond them. The intention of this 
exogenous discourse is that the citizen can refer back to either the process of discourse 
production or the content of the discourse itself to understand their role and space in the 
deliberation process. Divorced from the center of the debate in these cases, the 
democratic subject relies on the mutual recognition and contestation of academic and 
political economic elites.22  As Carvalho notes this fact should not dissuade democratic 
citizens from participating in the politics of climate change—quite the opposite. Rather 
citizens should take to “informal political participation and citizen mobilization” via 
protest, online petitions, etc.23  In other words: instead of being a participant in the 
process of bridging separate discourse or even the subject of the discourse itself—
democratic subjects should take to creating their own discourse (a virtual enclave of 
sorts). 
 
                                                          
20 Pepermans, Yves, and Pieter Maeseele. “Democratic Debate and Mediated Discourses on 
Climate Change: From Consensus to De/politicization.”Environmental Communication 8.2 
(2014): 216-32. 
21 Carvalho, Anabela. “Media(ted)discourses and Climate Change: A Focus on Political 
Subjectivity and (dis)engagement.” WIREs Clim Chang Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate 
Change (2010) p. 172-174 
22 Pearse, Rebecca p.132-133 
23 Carvalho, p. 173 
Res Cogitans (2016) 7                                                                                                                Izsó | 128 
 
 
 2155-4838 | commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans 
The claims of Carvalho, et al. do little to assuage my concerns about the ontological 
conception of the citizen in discourse generation. Are we to assume that citizens should 
aspire to create these sorts of outlier discourses with intent that they will one day form a 
more equitable bridge between political economic institutions and climate science? 
Even if we are to conclude that the aforementioned aspiration should be the objective of 
democratic deliberation by citizen-spawned discourses, the bridge between the elite 
parties has demarcated the content of climate discourse into the same expert-oriented 
camps. The knowledge generated by the two elite parties has still has no use for an 
ontological element other than an exchange medium. By constructing a bridge between 
shared discourse generation—this time absent the citizen as a primary consideration—
we would be left with prompting the citizen to find a set of adherent discourses within 
the conjoined space, or (should they wish to be “unmediated”) find a yet unclaimed 
locus of discourse beyond the ever expanding grid of shared climate science and 
political economic deliberation.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Charles Taylor famously wrote that democratic societies are necessarily exclusionary: 
 
What is the source of this thrust toward exclusion? We might put it this way: 
Democracy is inclusive because it is the government of all the people; but 
paradoxically, this is also the reason that democracy tends toward exclusion. 
The exclusion is a by-product of the need, in self-governing societies, of a high 
degree of cohesion. Democratic states need something like a common identity.24   
 
What Taylor had in mind was that by attempting to bridge the dynamic identities, 
political commitments, and autonomy of citizens; democratic societies run the risk of 
subverting the very inclusivity that makes them democratic in the first place. Stevenson 
and Dryzek have attempted just this: in looking for common ground between political 
economic institutions and climate science institutions (and only incidentally the 
citizen), they have constructed a shared space for discourse generation which excludes 
those incapable of generating independent discourse. By establishing the discursive 
bridge, Stevenson and Dryzek exposed an ontology of the citizen as a medium for 
exchange.  
 
Undoubtedly, knowledge exchange in democratic deliberation may well still be useful, 
but the resulting discourse from that knowledge will promote deliberative mechanisms 
in which the political economic institutions and climate science can construct new 
discursive bridges for the citizen to traverse. The ontology of the citizen is transposed 
into a type of participant in climate deliberation; a participant who either must find their 
                                                          
24 Taylor, Charles. “The Dynamics of Democratic Exclusion.” Journal of Democracy 9.4 (1998): 
143-56. 
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own non-expert discourse to generate or must simply rely on either party as an 
informant or their informer. 
 
 
 
 
 
